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Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP79-01143A000100100005-6

30 MAR 1950

MEMORANDUM TO: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

FROM: Assistant Director, ORE

SUBJECT: Requirements and Priorities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

REFERENCES:

- (a) Memorandum of Director of Central Intelligence to Rear Admiral John P. Womble, Jr., Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff, 1 December 1949, Subject: National Intelligence Survey Program.
- (b) Memorandum from Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, to Director of Central Intelligence, 27 August 1949, Subject: Priority List and Production Rate for NIS.
- (c) Memorandum of Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, to Director of Central Intelligence, 20 March 1950, Subject: Priority List and Production Rate for National Intelligence Surveys.

1. The intent of reference (a) was that the Joint Staff should reexamine the requirements set forth in reference (b) in the light of reduced agency capabilities and determine what reduction, if any, could be made without prejudice to the national security; but that the overriding consideration governing the determination should be the minimum requirements of the national security, not the capabilities of the producing agencies. Reference (c), however, clearly implies that the paramount consideration governing the Joint Staff determination was the capabilities of the producing agencies and not the interests of the national security; and that the equivalent of approximately eight (8) NIS per year does not, in fact, represent the minimum rate of NIS production required in the interest of the national security.

2. Though perhaps not generally known throughout the Government, it is pretty well accepted as fact that, if we are ever to have sound over-all intelligence, we must first have sound and adequate basic intelligence. It follows, therefore,

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that we should have at least the high priority NIS completed and on a maintenance basis with the minimum practicable delay. This end cannot be achieved if the principal users of NIS demur in stating their legitimate requirements each time there is a diminution of production capabilities. The only logical result to expect from such practice is the certain demise of the NIS Program and consequent reversion to the lamentable pre-war status of basic intelligence in particular and intelligence in general.

3. The only way to revitalize the NIS Program and its salutary impact upon the over-all intelligence of the nation is to raise capabilities to meet requirements, not lower requirements to meet capabilities, it being always understood that these requirements are the minimum consistent with the national security interest. Hence, it is recommended that the question of rate of production of NIS be reopened with the Joint Staff with a view to ascertaining whether or not a rate of approximately eight (8) per year will in fact meet their minimum needs without necessitating an undue volume of ad hoc requests upon the intelligence agencies for basic intelligence. Should the answer be in the negative, it is then recommended that the National Security Council be approached, after the matter has been taken up with the Secretary of Defense, with a view to obtaining augmentation for such agencies as may be unable to meet requirements. The draft of a memorandum designed to implement this action is attached hereto. This Office recommends signature of the memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence.

THEODORE BABBITT

Attachment:

Draft of memo  
to JCSORE:D/NIS  b7c 25X1Acc: Executive  
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